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Re: Scholarly communication, copyright, and fair use
- To: liblicense-l@lists.yale.edu
- Subject: Re: Scholarly communication, copyright, and fair use
- From: Kevin L Smith <kevin.l.smith@Duke.edu>
- Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 16:35:40 EDT
- Reply-to: liblicense-l@lists.yale.edu
- Sender: owner-liblicense-l@lists.yale.edu
I posted a reply to Sandy's comments about peer-review on my blog, so interested readers can go there to read those remarks. The thrust of my reply is that Sandy is address himself to a debate that is distinct from the point I am trying to make in my post. Upon further reflection, it seems like a good idea (list readers may disagree!) to make a few comments about Sandy's invocation of Judge Leval's highly influential article in his comment. First, it is worth pointing out that this 25-year-old law review article is not the final word about fair use. For one thing, Judge Leval never claimed that only transformative uses could be considered fair use. Had he made that claim, he would have been contradicting the plain language of the statute, and he was too smart a jurist to do that. Basically, his article is a reflection on the analysis of the first fair use factor, provoked by the reversal, on appeal, of a copyright decision he had made and his desire to argue that he had gotten the case right. We should remember that fair use is a highly fact-dependant analysis based in equity; no theoretical construct will ever be able to fully define it. Second, when the Supreme Court cited Judge Leval's article in "Campbell v. Acuff-Rose," they unfortunately set off a tendency to insist that all fair uses had to be transformative. The result, however, has not really been a narrowing of fair use so much as an expansion of the definition of transformation. The recent decision in the "Turnitin" case that found that a merely "repetitive" copying of papers submitted to an anti-plagiarism service was transformative because of the beneficial social purpose the service used those papers to provide is certainly a far cry from what Judge Leval was imagining. This tendency has really been good news for findings of fair use, but it has led, in my opinion, to some interesting reasoning. I have no doubt that, if the defendants in the Georgia State litigation prevail on fair use, there will be language similar to that used in "Turnitin" finding that the Georgia State use is transformative. Finally, one of the best reasons to read the article on which my blog post is based is that the author directly engages Judge Leval, arguing that, while the Judge successfully revisioned the first fair use factor in a helpful way, his approach to the second factor was too narrow and based on the limited approach to that factor that had prevailed for some years. Kasunic is really trying to do for the second factor what Judge Leval did for the first -- return to the purpose of copyright itself and try to understand how an analysis of the nature of the original work fits into the overall intent of copyright law and the fundamental reason that fair use is part of that law. Kevin L. Smith, J.D. Scholarly Communications Officer Perkins Library, Duke University PO Box 90193 Durham, NC 27708 919-668-4451 kevin.l.smith@duke.edu http://library.duke.edu/blogs/scholcomm/
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